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Notes on Business Ethics 
 
This paper formed the basis for five seminars taught as part of the International Business 
Ethics module, MSc Programme, Birkbeck, University of London, in 2010 and 2011. 
 
The overall aim of the seminars was to develop a series of arguments that can provide a 
route into an ethical analysis of the activities of business. Each of the arguments 
continues to be under development, and these notes can be read and critiqued in this light. 
There are of course other ways to address business ethics. The seminars considered how 
an ethical analysis of business activity might work.  
 
The paper has five parts:  
 Part 1: Responsibilities of firms 
 Part 2: Global responsibilities of firms 
 Part 3: Employment and authority 
 Part 4: Business disciplines and rationality 
 Part 5: Firms and the environment 
 
Part 1: Responsibilities of firms 
 
Introduction 
 
I will start with some ideas about ethical analysis. I am particularly interested in working 
out the nature and extent of the responsibility of firms. As part of this research I am 
trying to work out what ethical analysis involves. Part 1 includes some questions for 
further discussion.  
 
One approach may be suggested by Ronald Dworkin in Life’s Dominion. Dworkin argues 
that he ‘engages theoretical issues but begins with, and remains disciplined by, a moral 
subject of practical political importance’.1 He describes this approach as ‘philosophy 
from the inside out’. 
 
‘Theory can connect with practice in two different ways or directions. It can 
connect from the outside in: we can construct general theories of justice or 
personal ethics or constitutional interpretation from general principles about 
human nature or the structure of language or thought, or from first principles of 
some other character. Or we can proceed in the opposite direction, from the inside 
out, which is what I aim to do. We can begin with practical problems…...and then 
ask which general philosophical or theoretical issues we must confront in order to 
resolve those practical problems.’2 
 
In our case, the ‘moral subject of practical political importance’ is international business 
ethics. I think this approach may well apply. 
                                                 
1
 Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, Harper Collins, 1993, p. 28 
2
 Ibid., pp. 28-29 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2666690 
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Reasons for acting and ethical significance 
 
We can start an ethical analysis of business activity with some general ideas. 
 
Firms, and the individuals within firms, have reasons for acting. We can describe actions 
as right or wrong, and the outcomes of these actions as good or bad, including for the 
agent. This may reflect the distinction between deontological, consequentialist and virtue 
views of ethics.  
 
This suggests that actions and outcomes have ethical significance. Providing a reason 
suggests some responsibility of the agent for the action itself and for the outcomes of the 
action. 
 
These general ideas suggest that we can get an ethical analysis of business going by 
analysing a firm’s reasons for acting. 
 
The Introduction to Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons suggests something like this 
approach. 
 
‘Like my cat, I often simply do what I want to do. I am then not using an ability 
that only persons have. We know that there are reasons for acting, and that some 
reasons are better or stronger than others…. 
 
My central concepts are few. We have reasons for acting. We ought to act in 
certain ways, and some ways of acting are morally wrong. Some outcomes are 
good and bad, in a sense that has moral relevance….’3 
 
It may be argued that this places too much emphasis on ethical significance. It may be 
argued that an analysis of a firm's reasons for acting is primarily an analysis of rational 
rather than ethical reasons.  
 
Working definitions of rationality and of ethical significance may be useful here.  
 
Rationality may be described as the capacity of an agent to determine which actions are 
required to achieve an outcome. In some cases this includes the capacity to determine the 
most efficient and effective actions. Rationality may also refer to the nature of outcomes, 
but may suggest that these are not ethical outcomes but based, for example, on the 
rational interests of the agent.  
 
Ethical significance may be described as the harm or benefit caused by actions and 
outcomes including interests. The ideas of ‘harm’ and ‘benefit’ are informed by moral 
intuitions, moral values or moral principles.  
 
These working definitions, in common with most definitions in philosophy, and in ethics 
in particular, are only partially adequate and potentially controversial.  
                                                 
3
 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, 1984, p. ix 
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In the Concluding Chapter of Reasons and Persons Parfit presents an interesting 
argument for the existence of reasons for acting in general, and for ethical reasons in 
particular.  
 
‘Moral Sceptics deny that a moral theory could be true. More broadly, they deny 
that any theory could be objectively the best theory….. 
 
Many people are Moral Sceptics, but are not sceptics about rationality. The 
question of objectivity can be best pursued if we consider, not just moral reasons, 
but all kinds of reasons for acting. There are some claims which all of us accept. 
 
Suppose that, unless I move, I shall be killed by a falling rock, and that what I 
most want to do is to survive. Do I have a reason to move? It is undeniable that I 
do. This claim would have been accepted in all civilisations, at all times. This 
claim is true.  
 
Since there are some true claims about reasons for acting, we can deny what some 
sceptics claim. It is sometimes claimed that, unlike rocks or stars, there cannot be 
objective moral values. Such entities cannot exist. They are too queer to be part of 
‘the fabric of the Universe’. But, in the case just described, I do have a reason to 
move. This may not be a moral reason. But, since there is this reason, there can be 
reasons. Reasons for acting can, in the only relevant sense, ‘exist’. Since there are 
some reasons for acting, it is an open question whether some of these are moral 
reasons’.4 
 
We may describe all actions and outcomes as having some ethical significance. This 
suggests that reasons for acting are to this extent ethical reasons, as well as rational 
reasons.  
 
This may also be part of what Sabina Lovibond means in Ethical Formation. As part of a 
wider argument she talks about, ‘….that feeling for ethical ‘significance’ which enables 
us to detect, or invent, ethical uses for bits of language not marked as ethical by any 
special vocabulary’.5 Lovibond also talks about finding our way around the ‘space of 
reasons’.6 
 
The general idea of reasons for acting is also part of the approach developed by Michael 
Sandel in Justice: What’s The Right Thing Do?. Sandel is concerned with how we can 
make sense of moral and political questions. In the first chapter of Justice he discusses a 
number of real moral and political issues as well as the theoretical Runaway Trolley 
example. In trying to sum up an approach to these issues he says the following.   
 
‘How, then, can we reason our way through the contested terrain of justice and 
injustice, equality and inequality, individual rights and the common good?....  
                                                 
4
 Ibid., p. 452 
5
 Sabina Lovibond, Ethical Formation, Harvard, 2002, pp. 46-47 
6
 Ibid., p. 21 
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We start with an opinion, or a conviction, about the right thing to do….Then we 
reflect on the reason for our conviction, and seek out the principle on which it is 
based…Then, confronted with a situation that confounds the principle, we are 
pitched into confusion….Feeling the force of this confusion, and the pressure to 
sort it out, is the impulse to philosophy.’7 
 
Sandel goes on to discuss what happens ‘when moral reflection turns political’.   
 
‘When moral reflection turns political, when it asks what laws should govern our 
collective life, it needs engagement with the tumult of the city, with the arguments 
and incidents that roil the public mind….They prompt us to articulate and justify 
our moral and political convictions, not only among family and friends but also in 
the demanding company of our fellow citizens. 
 
More demanding still is the company of political philosophers, ancient and 
modern, who thought through, in sometimes radical and surprising ways, the ideas 
that animate civic life  - justice and rights, obligation and consent, honour and 
virtue, morality and law.’8 
 
Sandel’s ideas also refer back to the earlier discussion of ethical analysis. Sandel 
considers how we might ‘reason our way through the contested terrain of justice and 
injustice….’ but also talks about how this ‘needs some engagement with the tumult of the 
city’. 
 
I think Stuart Hampshire picks up this latter idea in Innocence and Experience. He states 
the problem as follows. 
 
‘The great civilisations of the past have not been created and sustained principally 
by quietly virtuous people with a delicate sense of justice. On the contrary they 
have generally been the products, or the by-products, of overweening ambition 
and of a large appetite for power and glory.’9  
 
This is close to what Hampshire describes as ‘Machiavelli’s problem’. At the end of this 
book, Hampshire provides the following account of how this might work out. 
 
‘We should look in society not for consensus, but for ineliminable and acceptable 
conflicts, and for rationally controlled hostilities, as the normal condition of 
mankind; not only normal, but also the best condition of mankind from the moral 
point of view, both between states and within states. This was Heraclitus’s vision: 
that life, and liveliness, within the soul and within society, consists in perpetual 
conflicts between rival impulses and ideals, and that justice presides over the 
                                                 
7
 Michael Sandel, Justice, Allen Lane, 2009, p. 28 
8
 Ibid., p. 29 
9
 Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience, Penguin, 1989, p. 161 
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hostilities and finds sufficient compromises to prevent madness of the soul, and 
civil war or war between people’.10 
 
Although there is much to discuss in this argument, and much to dispute, I think it does 
suggest something important about the nature of ethics in business. 
 
With this discussion in mind, if we start an analysis of business activity with an idea that 
firms have reasons for acting, we will need to identify the sources of these reasons. 
 
One source is the public information provided by the firm. This may include Annual 
Reports, public websites and public statements made by individuals in positions of 
authority within the firm. We will discuss later the idea that these are public reasons for 
acting.  
 
Public information may not provide a complete analysis of the firm’s reasons for acting. 
This will require analysis of the at least some of the following: the private reasons for 
acting of agents within the firm, in particular where these are not fully explained by, or 
differ from, public reasons; the views of citizens outside of the firm; analysis by civil 
society organisations and the media; the legislative and public policy context for the 
firm’s actions and outcomes; independent and academic research about the actions and 
outcomes of the firm. 
 
Discussion: 
 Does this analysis of reasons for acting form a useful starting point for an analysis of 
business ethics? 
 Is the idea of ethical significance suggested here too expansive or too inclusive? 
 To test these ideas we can discuss examples of reasons for acting in real cases or 
situations. What is ethically significant about these examples of reasons for acting? 
 
Bounded social activities 
 
The discussion of reasons for acting begins to suggest that an ethical analysis of business 
activity is an analysis of all the actions and outcomes of the firm.  
 
We can develop this idea with a further general claim: the firm is a bounded social 
activity. The firm is a social activity in the sense that it involves a more or less 
coordinated set of actions by a group of people. It is bounded in the sense that only 
certain actions and outcomes may count as the actions and outcomes of the firm.  
 
The firm may also be described as just one kind of social activity. Other social activities 
may be described by various organisational arrangements. Bounded social activities can 
be further grouped into at least two further categories: communities and jurisdictions.  
 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., p. 189 
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The idea communities in useful because it can refer to a wide range of informal groupings 
at national, sub-national and supra-national levels. The idea of jurisdictions is useful 
because it includes the legal arrangements that form part of the boundary of social 
activities. The people who make up these various groupings can, in general, be described 
as the citizens of jurisdictions and members of one or more community or other social 
activity.  
 
The firm’s reasons for acting will suggest responsibility for actions and outcomes within 
a boundary. We can describe this boundary as reflecting a view of the firm as a particular 
social activity within a given community and jurisdiction.  
 
The analysis of the reasons for acting of the firm may be an analysis of the reasons for 
acting of one bounded social activity amongst others.  
 
The nature of these social activities and the relationship between these activities and 
citizens may reflect further distinctions in ethics and political philosophy between social 
contract, rights based, libertarian, communitarian and other views about social and 
political life.  
 
Discussion:  
 Does the idea of a bounded social activity help to place an ethical analysis of business 
activity in a wider context? 
 Should firms be analysed as a specific type of social arrangement, rather than as a 
bounded social activity as suggested here? 
 
Value creation and four dimensions of value 
 
In general, the purpose of any bounded social activity can be described as the creation 
and promotion of certain goods. One way of describing the goods created by firms is 
through the idea of value creation. This idea has been developed by Michael Porter 
amongst others.  
 
On this view, the firm may be described as a centre of value creation. The actions of 
firms produce a range of outcomes. One group of outcomes is the products of the firm. 
The value created by the firm can be measured by the value created by these products. 
The actions of the firm are, in general, organised by the attempt to create value through 
products as one group of outcomes.  
 
We can describe the firm is a complex social activity that produces outcomes that are 
wider than its products. The full value created by the firm may be the value created by all 
the firm’s actions and outcomes. One aspect of the firm as a bounded social activity is to 
limit the definition of value creation to the products of the firm. 
  
In general each firm will claim responsibility for the outcomes that fall within the 
boundary of the firm. Differences in views about the boundary of the firm, and changes to 
these boundaries, will suggest differences in claims about responsibility for the actions 
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and outcomes of the firm. The reasons for acting provided by firms will be informed by a 
view about the boundary of the firm. Each firm will appeal to multiple reasons for acting. 
However, these reasons will be based on at least two principles.  
 
The first principle is legality. Legal rules will provide a formal basis for setting the 
boundary of the firm and defining prohibited, permitted and required actions and 
outcomes. Legal rules will also define both the boundary of the firm itself and the firm’s 
relationship to other firms, other social activities and individual citizens. 
 
The second principle is making a financial return. In general a minimum financial return 
will enable the firm to meet its financial obligations, for example to shareholders, 
creditors and employees. This will enable the firm to survive.  
 
We can describe a market as a situation in which the relationships between firms create 
the possibility for competition to make a financial return. This will create competition 
both for making a minimum financial return and also opportunities for maximising a 
financial return. This will enable the firm to flourish. A competitive relationship between 
firms may further support and define the boundaries between firms as social activities.  
 
A range of possible boundaries and dimensions of value creation are suggested in Figure 
1 (at the end of the paper).
11
  
 
The boundary of the firm as a social activity and the dimensions of value creation will 
suggest a range of claims about the responsibility for the actions and outcomes of the 
firm. We can describe these as a spectrum from ‘minimal’ to ‘maximal’ claims about 
corporate responsibility. This is described in Figure 2 (at the end of the paper).  
 
Discussion: 
 Further discussion of the ‘four dimensions’ model, including changes to the 
boundaries and the boundaries of a public sector organisation 
 Does this model provide a useful way of representing the idea of the firm as a 
bounded social activity? 
 Discussion of examples of the location of specific firms within the various boundaries 
and along the ‘minimal-maximal’ spectrum of corporate responsibility 
 
Boundaries, principles and ethical analysis 
 
We can describe legality as principle L and making a financial return as principle F. We 
can use these principles as one basis for an ethical analysis of business activity. The 
following discussion suggests some aspects of this analysis.  
 
 
                                                 
11
 The notes What are firms responsible for?: corporate social responsibility,  value creation and public 
scrutiny for a seminar for the Oxford-Achilles Working Group on CSR includes a more detailed, and 
earlier, version of the ‘four dimensions of value’ model. 
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/research/people/Pages/LaurenceCranmer.aspx 
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A spectrum of reasons within Boundary A 
 
The firm’s multiple reasons for acting may refer to L and F. In general, Boundary A 
suggests that the social activity of the firm is bounded by an appeal to L and F. It may be 
possible to identify a spectrum of appeals to F within Boundary A. We have discussed the 
ideas of survival and flourishing. It may also be possible to identify a spectrum of appeals 
to L. For example, a range of appeals from minimal to full adherence to legality. 
However, this is more problematic because of the relative formality of L as a principle. 
The non-legal principle of the rule of law may not allow for the interpretation of L within 
the social activity of the firm.  
 
Prioritising L and F 
 
We may wish to prioritise L and F. L may be the dominant principle. L provides the 
overall basis for all reasons for acting. F then provides the basis for reasons for acting 
within the requirements of L. The relative informality of F allows for a wider range of 
reasons for acting, for example along the spectrum of survival to flourishing. 
 
Ethical significance and rationality 
 
Agents who appeal to reasons for acting based on L and F may hold a range of views 
about the ethical significance of L and F. For example, it may be argued that the appeal to 
L and F is based on a rational concern for sanctions in the case of L, and financial 
success and failure in the case of F. In both cases it may be argued that rational concerns 
do not involve claims about ethical significance. This may describe the pragmatic or 
instrumental view that agents take in practical life.  
 
Analysis of multiple reasons 
 
L and F may provide a basis for the ethical analysis of multiple reasons for acting where 
these reasons do not appear to be based on L or F. For example, a firm may appeal to a 
reason based on the non-financial benefits of an outcome. This reason may itself be based 
on F through an appeal to a particular customer preference for this outcome. The reason 
for acting to produce the outcome is then explained by F rather than by a reason in 
addition to F.  
 
Extended responsibility 
 
There may be cases where a firm’s reasons for acting are not exhausted by an appeal to L 
and F. Since L and F refer, in part, to the firm’s responsibilities, we can identify a further 
principle that we can call extended responsibility or ER. ER may be a bundle of further 
principles including human rights, working conditions, environmental protection, poverty 
reduction or the creation or promotion of a range of specific goods. These principles may 
form the basis for a range of social activities, including the firm as a social activity.  
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ER may provide one explanation for the intentions of the agents who originally 
established a particular firm. If we describe the firm as a social activity it is possible to 
see the intended purpose of the firm as based on a variety of goods. This intention may 
become subordinate to L and F once the firm is launched into the legal and financial 
context of the market. The firm then becomes a bounded social activity, with L and F the 
principles that determine the boundary.   
 
There may be cases where a firm appeals to ER as a basis for its current activities within 
L and F. One example of a principle within ER may be an appeal to a minimum level of 
human rights (HR) for employees and possibly communities within which the firm 
operates. In some cases HR may be a significant principle but remain subordinate to L 
and F.  
 
Where HR is not subordinate to L and F, it may be necessary to prioritise the three 
principles. In the case of HR, one option is to consider HR as analogous to L. HR 
involves a series of reasons for acting in a form that is similar to legal reasons for acting. 
This may not be the case for other dimensions of ER. 
 
One example of the relationship between L, F and HR is as follows: 
1. Establish ER as a principle in addition to L and F 
2. Establish HR as a principle within the bundle of ER principles 
3. Appeal to institutional or authoritative sources of HR claims 
4. Establish HR claims that are relevant to the firm 
5. Establish prioritisation and balancing criteria for L, F and HR. This could be 
analogous to L. For example, the firm may appeal to L, then to HR, then to F.  
 
The L, HR, F sequence suggests that HR is appealed to prior to F. In this example, HR is 
a dominant principle with regard to F. So, in establishing reasons for acting: L is the 
primary principle; followed by HR; followed by F. 
 
The firm is likely to have access to established sources for the content of L and F. In the 
case of ER principles such as HR, the firm may appeal to formal and informal institutions 
for advice on the content of these principles. For example, the United Nations may 
provide a global governance or institutional basis for HR. Informal civil society 
institutions may provide a non-governmental and independent institutional basis for HR, 
although such institutions may be controversial. 
 
The L, HR, F sequence may be applied to other ER principles. In these cases, this may 
reflect relative the formality of L compared to F. This suggests that there may be a degree 
of choice about the appeal to, and application of, F.  
 
We will return to the issue of the prioritisation of principles in Part 2. 
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Internal and external reasons 
 
In the analysis of L, F and ER we may also make a distinction between internal and 
external reasons for acting. For example, L and F may form the internal basis for the 
firm’s reasons for acting. We may make a distinction between an internal justification for 
the firm’s activities and an external view of the firm’s activities. The internal reasons for 
acting may not provide a sufficient justification for agents outside of the firm.  
 
One group of agents outside of the boundary of the firm may be described as 
stakeholders. Stakeholders may be variously defined. In general a stakeholder is an agent 
with an interest in the actions and outcomes of the firm. Stakeholders may be reflected in 
Boundary B or C in the four dimensions diagram.  
 
A wider definition of agents outside of the boundary of the firm may include citizens of 
jurisdictions within which the firm operates, or citizens across all jurisdictions. This may 
be reflected in Boundary C or D.  
 
In some cases the external view of a firm’s activities reflects similar principles to those 
contained in ER, for example HR. We have discussed the possibility that ER may provide 
the basis for further internal reasons for acting. This discussion suggests that in some 
cases there may be a difference between the internal and external view of the firm’s 
reasons for acting. This may inform the debate about corporate responsibility. 
 
One view of the firm suggests that L and F provide internal reasons for acting that are 
sufficient to provide a full justification for the actions and outcomes of the firm. This may 
be based on the ethical significance of these actions and outcomes informed by an 
empirical account of the how L and F affect these actions and outcomes. This suggests 
Boundary A as the boundary of the firm as a social activity.  
 
On this view, external reasons that appeal to ER may inform L or F, for example through 
the debate about public policy in the case of L, or customer and investor preferences in 
the case of F. These reasons may change the position of Boundary A, but not the view 
that Boundary A forms the boundary of the firm as a social activity.  
 
We can discuss the implications of these various arguments for the nature of the firm and 
the idea of markets both within a single jurisdiction and globally across multiple 
jurisdictions.  
 
Discussion: 
 Discuss the application of these and other examples of the analysis of reasons, 
principles and boundaries to real cases 
 Do the arguments so far begin to form a basis for an ethical analysis of business? 
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Part 2: Global responsibilities of firms  
 
Introduction  
 
Part 2 uses a range of the arguments developed in Part 1, in some cases as assumptions. 
This does not imply that these arguments are correct.  
 
The notes for Part 2 are divided into three sections. The first considers the idea of public 
reason as a possible way to address at least some of a firm’s reasons for acting. The 
second discusses legality (L) as this applies across global jurisdictions. The third 
discusses financial return (F), and in particular the ethical and empirical analysis of the 
effectiveness of F within one jurisdiction and across global jurisdictions.  
 
These notes provide a series of arguments that can be worked through and critiqued using 
examples of actual firms and current issues in international business ethics.  
 
Reflection on principles 
 
It may be useful to outline an approach to the consideration of the principles discussed in 
these notes. This approach draws on the idea of ‘reflective equilibrium’ developed by 
John Rawls in A Theory of Justice
12
 and later in Political Liberalism
13
.  
 
As a starting point we can consider the principles that inform a current collection of 
views or convictions in the area addressed, in this case international business ethics. 
These convictions are likely to be present in the public debate and in the reasons for 
acting of, in this case, firms. The idea that firms operate within the law and seek to make 
a financial return suggests two such principles. We may then seek to state these principles 
clearly, for example as legality (L) and financial return (F).  
 
Once stated, the principles can be subject to analysis and reflection, including ethical 
reflection. The process of analysis and reflection may amend, change or confirm the 
original views and convictions.  
 
One outcome of this process may be a new ‘equilibrium’ about our views and 
convictions, informed by ‘reflection’. Of course this equilibrium, if achieved, is subject to 
further reflection and amendment. This process can apply to reflection on both theoretical 
and practical issues. One view of a democratic public debate involves the interplay of 
both kinds of reflection over time amongst citizens.  
 
Public and private reason 
 
The discussion of internal and external reasons suggests a distinction between public and 
private reason.  
 
                                                 
12
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford, 1973, pp. 48-50 
13
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia, 1996 (Paperback edition), p. 8 
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One view of the firm’s reasons for acting is that these are private reasons. This suggests a 
further characteristic of the boundary of the firm, as shown in Figure 1. Boundary A then 
marks a distinction between a private social activity and the public social activities that 
surround it.  
 
In general, the area outside of Boundary A may be described as a public space. 
Boundaries B, C and D may then mark various dimensions of this public space. The 
appeal to internal reasons based on legality (L) and making a financial return (F) may 
then be described as an appeal within private reason. 
 
It may be useful to consider an idea of public reason as distinct from private reason. One 
influential idea of public reason is developed by John Rawls, in particular in Political 
Liberalism. 
 
‘A political society, and indeed every reasonable and rational agent, whether it be 
an individual, or a family or an association, or even a confederation of political 
societies, has a way of formulating its plans, of putting its ends in an order of 
priority and of making its decisions accordingly. The way a political society does 
this is its reason; its ability to do things is also its reason, though in a different 
sense: it is an intellectual and moral power, rooted in the capacity of its human 
members. 
 
Not all reasons are public reasons, as these are the nonpublic reasons of churches 
and universities and many other associations in civil society….Public reason, 
then, is public in three ways: as the reason of citizens as such, it is the reason of 
the public; its subject is the good of the public and matters of fundamental justice; 
and its nature and content is public, being given by ideals and principles 
expressed by society’s conception of political justice, and conducted open to view 
on that basis’.14 
 
An idea of public reason is also central to Amartya Sen’s analysis in The Idea of Justice. 
Sen notes some differences in conceptions of public reasoning, for example in the work 
of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas
15
. In the context of these various views about public 
reasoning Sen notes the ‘general recognition that the central issues in a broader 
understanding of democracy are political participation, dialogue and public interaction’16. 
Sen talks about ‘The crucial role of public reasoning in the practice of democracy’17 and 
that ‘If the demands of justice can be assessed only with the help of public reasoning, and 
if public reasoning is constitutively related to the idea of democracy, then there is an 
intimate connection between justice and democracy, with shared discursive features’18. 
Although Sen is interested in a wider analysis of justice, these views about public 
reasoning may be useful for our analysis.  
                                                 
14
 Ibid., pp. 212-213 
15
 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, Allen Lane, 2009, pp. 324-326 
16
 Ibid., p. 326 
17
 Ibid., p. 326 
18
 Ibid., p. 326 
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One view of a firm’s reasons for acting could be that these are private reasons made as 
justifications of actions and outcomes within the public space, but not themselves subject 
to public reasoning. 
 
L and F are established within the public space but, once established, form the boundary 
of the firm. The firm’s reasons for acting appeal to L and F.  
 
L and F are themselves subject to public reason. External reasons are then part of public 
reasoning about L and F. On this view extended responsibility (ER), and the bundle of 
principles it may include, is not a principle that informs the internal private reasons of the 
firm. 
 
A different view of a firm’s reasons for acting is that these are reasons within the public 
space and are subject to public reason. On this view, the boundary of the firm is open to 
external reasons. ER may then become part of a firm’s reasons for acting, and subject to 
discussion of the prioritisation of principles.  
 
The former view may suggest that an ethical analysis of business comprises an analysis 
of aspects of L and F within the firm, and of ER outside of the firm. The analysis of ER is 
part of public reasoning about the content of L and F. This suggests a minimal view of 
corporate responsibility, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
The latter view suggests that an ethical analysis of business may involve aspects of ER as 
internal reasons for the firm. This suggests a maximal view of corporate responsibility.  
 
If we accept some definition of public reason then it is likely that the actions and 
outcomes of firms will form part of public reasoning. L establishes the formal aspects of 
the boundary of the firm, and F establishes the more informal aspects of this boundary 
including both the survival and flourishing of the firm.  
 
The more limited and structured definition of public reason in Rawls may support the 
view that while L and F as principles may be subject to public reasoning, the firm itself is 
a private social activity and subject to private reason. The more expansive view in Sen 
may suggest that the firm’s internal reasons for acting are also subject to public reasoning 
as part of the practice of democracy. The application of these ideas by these authors may 
of course by disputed. 
 
Global firms and global public reason: legality (L)  
 
The idea of public reason may be applied both to a single jurisdiction and to the global 
community of jurisdictions; we could call this global public reason. Both Rawls and Sen 
develop something like this idea in The Law of Peoples
19
 and The Idea of Justice 
respectively. 
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This may help in the analysis of the following: the content of L and F may be different 
across different jurisdictions. 
 
If we consider L: one idea of a jurisdiction suggests a society of people bound by the rule 
of law. This provides the widest justification for all reasons within L, and for L itself as a 
principle.  
 
The boundary of the firm may initially be established by L within the jurisdiction from 
which the firm originates. The boundary may be established in different positions across 
the multiple global jurisdictions in which the firm operates. The idea of the firm’s 
operations may be too restrictive: we may need to consider the position of the boundary 
across all jurisdictions that are affected by the actions and outcomes of the firm. 
 
We can describe L for the jurisdiction from which the firm originates as local legality 
(LL). We can describe L for all of the multiple jurisdictions within which the firm may 
operate as multiple legality (ML). ML will refer to a group of jurisdictions each with an 
associated LL.  
 
Where the firm appeals to LL it may exceed or fall short of the requirements of ML in 
some cases, depending in the content of ML for each jurisdiction. Falling short of ML 
may be more critical, although exceeding ML may have significant implications for F. If 
we define L as meeting minimal legal requirements, then both exceeding and falling short 
of ML involves the firm failing to L as the basis for the firm’s reasons for acting.  
 
The idea of public reason may be useful here. A limited view of public reason suggests 
that the firm is subject to private reasoning within LL. From the point of view of ML, the 
firm’s reasons for acting may be subject to global public reason. The idea of global 
public reason combines the public reason exercised within a given jurisdiction or, more 
informally, a given community. 
 
In general firms may be subject to aspects of global public reason when the firm’s actions 
and outcomes affect multiple jurisdictions. The content of global public reason may 
include aspects of ER.  
 
The global firm may then be described as in the following situation: the firm appeals to L 
within the jurisdiction from which it operates. Within this jurisdiction it may be argued 
that the firm’s reasons for acting are private reasons and not subject to public reason. 
However, we may now describe L more precisely as LL. The firm’s reasons for acting 
may now appeal to ML rather than LL, if it is to continue to appeal to L in general. The 
requirement to appeal to ML is not a formal requirement within LL, nor is it directly a 
requirement within any aspect of ML. We could argue that this requirement is an aspect 
of global public reason. On this view, the firm is now subject to global public reason. 
 
The appeal to ML within global public reason is then analogous to the appeal to LL, or 
simply L from the point of view of a single jurisdiction. The firm’s reasons for acting will 
now be more complex.  
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The requirement to appeal to ML as a principle is also analogous to the argument based 
on the rule of law that establishes the requirement to appeal to L. It may be argued that 
this requirement is itself based in global public reason. 
 
This may be reflected in the following statement from a recent UN Report on business 
and human rights, ‘Companies know they must comply with all applicable laws to obtain 
and sustain their legal licence to operate...’20 
 
This argument may appeal to a pragmatic view of ‘applicable laws’ or it may appeal to 
ML as a principle within global public reason. In either case the firm may consider LL 
for the jurisdictions in which it operates and appeal to at least a minimal ML for all 
jurisdictions.  
 
The content of global public reason may also include ER. As a bundle of principles, 
aspects of ER may be included within L for some but not all jurisdictions. However, there 
may be aspects of ER that are not included in ML. This is similar to the situation of ER 
within a particular jurisdiction.  
 
An idea of global ER may be reflected in the continuation of the statement quoted above 
from the UN Report. The Report discusses human rights in particular, or HR. We can use 
this as one example of ER.  
 
‘46. Companies know they must comply with all applicable laws to obtain and 
sustain their legal licence to operate. However, over time companies have found 
that legal compliance alone may not ensure their social licence to operate, 
particularly where the law is weak. The social licence to operate is based in 
prevailing social norms that can be as important to the success of a business as 
legal norms. Of course, social norms may vary by region and industry. But one of 
them has acquired near-universal recognition by all stakeholders, namely the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights, or, put simply, to not infringe on 
the rights of others. 
 
47. By near-universal is meant two things. First, the corporate responsibility to 
respect is acknowledged by virtually every company and industry CSR initiative, 
endorsed by the world’s largest business associations, affirmed in the Global 
Compact and its worldwide national networks, and enshrined in such soft law 
instruments as the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the OECD Guidelines. Second, 
violations of this social norm are routinely brought to public attention globally 
through mobilized local communities, networks of civil society, the media 
including blogs, complaints procedures such as the OECD NCPs, and if they 
involve alleged violations of the law, then possibly through the courts. This 
transnational normative regime reaches not only Western multinationals, which 
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have long experienced its effects, but also emerging economy companies 
operating abroad, and even large national firms. 
 
48. As a well established and institutionalized social norm, the corporate 
responsibility to respect exists independently of State duties and variations in 
national law. There may be situations in which companies have additional 
responsibilities. But the responsibility to respect is the baseline norm for all 
companies in all situations’.21 
 
Paragraph 47 suggests how global public reason might operate through a combination of 
global agreements and the arguments and activities of citizens and civil society 
institutions. This exercise of global public reason may inform a firm’s reasons for acting.  
 
The argument that a view of human rights (HR) may form part of a ‘transnational 
normative regime’ suggests the idea of an ethical analysis of business activity. The idea 
of ‘a well established and institutionalized social norm’ and that ‘the corporate 
responsibility to respect exists independently of State duties and variations in national 
law’, suggests that firm’s appeal to ER (or HR in this case) as an aspect of global public 
reason. 
 
This argument may move beyond the idea of different legislation within different 
jurisdictions, that is the move from L to LL and ML. This may be an attempt to define 
HR, as one aspect of ER, across all jurisdictions. This is outside of L and is part of global 
public reason.  
 
In the analysis of the prioritization of L, F and ER, we used HR as an example. We also 
suggested that HR may have a similar form to L. The idea of HR across jurisdictions is 
informed by an idea of universal human rights. This suggests that the ethical significance 
of HR supports HR as a principle that informs all reasons for acting, including the firm’s 
reasons for acting.  
 
This view of HR is part of an argument about the ethical significance of the outcomes of 
global public reasoning. A significant implication of this argument may be the 
establishment of a global rule of law supported by institutions of investigation, 
adjudication and enforcement. This may operate in parallel with or, in some cases, 
supersede L, LL and ML. The boundary of the firm may then be defined, in part, by a 
combination of L (or LL) within a jurisdiction, ML across all jurisdictions within global 
public reason, and by a principle of universal legality (UL).  
 
UL may be preceded by transitional agreements between jurisdictions and across regions, 
as well as claims within global public reason that anticipate UL. Some of these 
agreements and claims may already be in place.  
 
The argument about UL is subject to significant empirical and ethical debate and 
disagreement. It is important to note here that I am not an expert in the legal arguments 
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involved; this is an attempt to consider these issues as part of an ethical analysis of 
business. 
 
If a firm’s reasons for acting are currently informed by aspects of HR, this may be an 
example of a firm both responding to global public reason in this area of ER and 
anticipating potential changes to LL, ML and UL.  
 
At this stage, we can consider one further aspect of global public reason.  
 
HR is an example of a principle within ER that may be applied to all jurisdictions. Many 
views of HR are universal in nature and so must apply globally across all jurisdictions; on 
these views all people have a set of human rights that must be respected. HR is universal 
because people may live within a single jurisdiction, but hold human rights that transcend 
these jurisdictions. 
 
Other principles within ER may apply globally but based on different argument, for 
example that some actions and outcomes of the firm’s activities may have a wide effect 
on the natural environment. This may include carbon emission, pollution, and the 
maintenance of natural habitats and biodiversity.  
 
These affects may not be limited to any single jurisdiction, or even combination of 
jurisdictions. This is in part because some aspects of the natural environment may not be 
directly subject to property rights within any jurisdiction, such as the atmosphere and 
much of the oceans.  
 
These affects may also transcend jurisdictions in another sense. We can take the example 
of the loss of a species. This loss may take place wholly or primarily within a single 
jurisdiction. However the ethical significance of the loss may appeal to arguments that do 
not refer to local or global jurisdictions. 
 
These aspects of ER require further analysis. However, they may suggest aspects of 
global public reason that require global agreement and, potentially UL, if the effects are 
to be fully reflected in the reasons for acting of agents including firms.   
 
We have focused on L rather than F in this discussion; we will discuss F in the next 
section. 
 
Global firms and global public reason: financial return (F) 
 
The analysis of L is the analysis of a relatively formal principle. F is a relatively informal 
principle. 
 
In the prioritisation of L and F it may be argued that L is the dominant principle, and F is 
the subordinate principle. The firm appeals to L as the basis for all reasons for acting. 
Within the boundary established by L, the firm then appeals to F. L and F taken together 
establish the final boundary of the firm. This is Boundary A in Figure 1.   
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This becomes more complex when we consider the prioritisation of LL, ML and F. This 
may be resolved in part by arguing that all firms, ‘…must comply with all applicable 
laws to obtain and sustain their legal licence to operate...’22. This raises the issues 
discussed in the previous section. 
 
In general, it may be argued that the prioritisation remains as follows: the firm appeals to 
LL, ML, or possibly some version of UL; the firm then appeals to F within the boundary 
or boundaries set by these versions of L.  
 
The prioritisation of L and F is based, in part, on the relative formality of L. The relative 
formality may be based on the ethical significance of the two principles: the firm acting 
within the rule of law (that underpins L) is based on a stronger evaluation of ethical 
significance than the firm either surviving or flourishing (that underpins F).  
 
This clear prioritisation is also based on the relative independence of L and F. The 
prioritization becomes more complex if we consider how each principle is informed by 
and affects the other.  
 
In general, we may argue that the content of L is shaped, in part, by claims based on the 
ethical and empirical analysis of the effectiveness of F. This suggests that F should 
become a principle that sets the boundary of the firm as a social activity. L is then 
informed by an analysis of F, and creates the conditions within which F may apply. The 
combination of L and F sets the boundary of the firm. L is then formal at a given point in 
time: the content of L may have been informed by F in the past, and may be changed as F 
changes in the future.  
 
It may be argued that some other principle could be adopted to set the boundary of the 
firm: for example, to promote the greatest environmental benefit (EN). Work through 
such a principle in detail is likely to be complex, in part because of the institutional 
arrangements and social activities that support F. It may be sufficient here to suggest that 
it is possible to identify another principle. The bundle of ER principles could be a source 
of these further principles. 
 
It may be argued that the ethical and empirical analysis of F suggests that F supports the 
greatest balance of benefit over harm. This is in part an analysis of the outcomes of a 
firm's activities, but it may also take into account the actions of firms and the effect of 
these actions on agents within the firm. One version of this analysis may appeal to claims 
about human nature and human communities: in particular that F is consistent with 
empirical claims about self-interest and the balance of cooperation and competition 
within both human nature and human communities.  
 
On this basis, the argument for some other principle (such as EN) would have to 
demonstrate a greater balance of benefit over harm. The comparison of F and EN 
involves both the empirical and ethical analysis of both principles. The empirical analysis 
                                                 
22
 Ibid., p. 13 
Notes on Business Ethics 
Laurence Cranmer 2010  Notes on Business Ethics - 2010-11.doc 19 
is complex. However the ethical analysis may be even more complex if F and EN involve 
views about ethical significance that are not comparable. 
 
We can apply this analysis to a given jurisdiction. However, within a jurisdiction two 
further arguments may apply.  
 
A firm that originates in a jurisdiction is likely to understand the content of L and F for 
that jurisdiction. The firm may also understand at least part of the empirical and ethical 
analysis of F, the way in which this has informed L, and the relationship between L and 
F.  
 
The jurisdiction will have some process in place for determining L. Whichever process is 
in place, the firm will at least be familiar with how this works. This may contribute to 
understanding. However, if the process allows for a balance of interests to be represented, 
the firm may also assent to L and F. Other agents within the jurisdiction may also broadly 
assent to L and F. One example of a process for achieving assent is democracy.  
 
We can describe the combination of understanding and assent as aspects of public reason 
within a jurisdiction.  
 
Understanding and assent may work out differently across jurisdictions, because views 
about F and L may be different across jurisdictions. In the case of L this is reflected in the 
distinction between LL and ML.  
 
In the case of F, although it may be reasonable for F to inform L within a single 
jurisdiction, this may not be reasonable for other jurisdictions. Indeed, within a 
jurisdiction there may be disagreement about the way in which F informs L; across 
jurisdictions this disagreement may be greater.  
 
The ideas of understanding and assent may be useful here. There may be differences in 
the understanding of, or assent to, the empirical and ethical analysis of F across 
jurisdictions. Indeed, it is possible that a further principle (such as EN, discussed above) 
may have a higher priority than F in some jurisdictions, even if this possibility is unlikely 
or uncommon. 
 
However, it may be argued that the empirical and ethical analysis of F will in fact inform 
L for all jurisdictions. On this view, F is appealed to within all jurisdictions and across all 
jurisdictions globally. It may also be argued that F should inform L for all jurisdictions, 
even in cases where this is not the case or not fully the case. Some arguments for a global 
market may include these views. This suggests that F nay be a universal principle, 
analogous to UL discussed above. 
 
The argument for a single understanding of F to be a universal principle may be based on 
an empirical and ethical analysis of the balance of harm and benefit. Where this applies 
across jurisdictions it may involve at least two further views about harm and benefit.  
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The first view suggests that this balance is broadly similar for all jurisdictions. The 
empirical and ethical analysis of the effectiveness of F will produce a similar result 
within each jurisdiction, and will therefore apply across jurisdictions.  
 
The second view suggests that the balance may be significantly different for each 
jurisdiction, if each jurisdiction is analysed independently. However, if all jurisdictions 
accept F, the balance for all jurisdictions is greater than if some do not accept F. For 
example, those jurisdictions where the harm is significantly greater than others may still 
receive a greater balance of benefit overall if they participate in the global acceptance of 
F. It is likely that assent to these arguments within these jurisdictions will be more 
difficult to achieve on this basis, but it may still be possible. This may form part of an 
empirical analysis of the benefits of F establishing the boundary of the firm as part of a 
global system of firms across jurisdictions.   
 
Both views may be described as part of the public reason within each jurisdiction, and 
part of global public reason across jurisdictions.  
 
Both views are based on an ethical and empirical analysis of the effectiveness of F.  
 
As discussed, the empirical analysis of F may suggest a different balance of harm and 
benefit across jurisdictions. In some cases this may be described as inequality across 
jurisdictions or regions. The analysis if complex and will include issues such as the causal 
role of F in supporting inequality. 
 
However, an empirical analysis of inequality may inform an ethical analysis. In 
particular, the degree of inequality may not be considered acceptable. It may be argued 
that poverty is a type of inequality. In general, poverty may be described as the point at 
which inequality creates substantial harm to an individual. Whatever definitions of 
inequality or poverty are used it may be argued that at some point the latter in particular 
may be considered unacceptable. 
 
In this case, the empirical and ethical analysis of F may not result in assent from the all 
jurisdictions, including those that are subject to inequality or poverty in this analysis. This 
suggests that F may not be a universal principle.  
 
We may describe this in an analogous way to the analysis of L. In the case of L we 
distinguished between LL and ML, and the possibility of UL.  
 
We may now need to distinguish between the following principles: financial return (F); 
local financial return (LF); financial return across multiple jurisdictions, multiple 
financial return (MF); and the possibility of financial return across all jurisdictions 
combined, universal financial return (UF). If F is not accepted, or is accepted in different 
forms across jurisdictions, this suggests that a further principle is appealed to.  
 
This analysis suggests the possibility that a further principle may set the boundary of the 
firm, to complement or replace F. We briefly discussed EN above. A further option could 
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be a principle that reflects the ethical significance of inequality and poverty. We can call 
this principle capability (C), as this may be part of a general capabilities approach. 
 
Most definitions of C will include a bundle of principles. This is similar to ER. We can 
discuss C in general at this stage, but recognising that each principle within C may 
require further analysis. 
 
C may inform a firm’s reasons for acting in a similar way to L and F: the firm’s reasons 
for acting now appeal to a view of human capabilities. It is important to note here that C 
replaces or complements F as a principle for firms.  
 
Another option would be for the various claims under C to be incorporated into L, in 
particular a form of UL. This may be analogous to a single jurisdiction that includes 
capabilities as part of redistributive and welfare arrangements. These elements of L form 
part of the boundary of the firm through legislation covering areas such as taxation, 
employment and health & safety.  
 
For C to replace or complement F this involves an additional principle that sets the 
boundary of the firm as a social activity. On this view, the firm has a direct responsibility 
to act on the basis of C. This will require a prioritization of L, F and C using a similar 
approach to that discussed in Part 1. 
 
One result of prioritization may suggest the following ordering: L, C, F. There are of 
course other priority orderings.  
 
In this case, the global firm may then be described as in the following situation: the firm 
appeals to a version of L (including LL, ML and UL); it then appeals to C, for example 
with a direct responsibility to reduce poverty; it then appeals to F. 
 
This prioritization is based on the argument that the ethical and empirical analysis of F 
does not support the greatest balance of benefit.  This prioritization suggests changes to 
the boundary of the firm and to the arrangements within the firm that may be designed to 
operate within L and to support and promote F. The social activity of the firm would then 
have a boundary that is similar in some respects to that of other social activities, such as 
development NGOs with boundaries set by L and C. This may be considered a 
fundamental change to the nature of the social activity of the firm. 
 
This view assumes a simple L, C, F prioritization. However, other more complex 
arrangements are possible. For example, the principle of a financial return for survival 
may be retained as a dominant principle. The firm may then prioritise as follows: L, 
F(survival), C, F(flourish). This suggests that the firm supports elements of C before it 
seeks to flourish through maximising a financial return.  
 
As another option, the firm may appeal to C in those jurisdictions where this principle is 
not addressed by other social activities. So, for a jurisdiction with low levels of poverty 
the prioritization may be: L, F, C, or may not include C. For a jurisdiction with high 
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levels of poverty the prioritization may be as above: L, F(survival), C, F(flourish). This 
would have an impact on the firm’s maximisation of F overall, but may also 
accommodate C.  
 
This approach to C may be similar to Martha Nussbaum’s argument in the article Beyond 
the Social Contract: Capabilities and Global Justice
23
. Nussbaum suggests that one of 
‘Ten Principles for a Global Structure’ includes the following: ‘Multinational 
corporations have responsibilities for promoting human capabilities in the regions in 
which they operate’24. We can discuss this Principle in terms of the analysis of L, F, C 
and public reason developed so far. 
 
‘(4) Multinational corporations have responsibilities for promoting human 
capabilities in the regions in which they operate. The understanding of what a 
corporation is for, up to now, has been dominated by the profit motive. This 
understanding has not prevented corporations from devoting quite a lot of money 
to charity domestically, but there is no generally accepted standard of moral 
responsibility. The new global order must have a clear public understanding that 
part of doing business decently in a region is to devote a substantial amount of 
one’s profits to promoting education and good environmental conditions. There 
are good efficiency arguments for this: corporations do better with a stable well-
educated work-force. Education also promotes political engagement, crucial to the 
health of a democracy; and corporations do well under conditions of political 
stability. None the less, those arguments should be subsidiary to a general public 
understanding that such support is what decency requires. At the same time, 
corporations should undertake to promote good labour conditions, going beyond 
what local laws require.’25   
 
It is interesting that Nussbaum also says in relation to capabilities that, ‘Notice, as well, 
that the allocation [of responsibilities] is an ethical allocation: there is no coercive 
structure over the whole to enforce on any given part a definite set of tasks’26. This may 
also be reflected in Rawls’ argument that the idea that public reason is, ‘….understood 
and honored by citizens is not, of course, matter of law’27.   
 
The debate about whether C should be a principle that sets the boundary of the firm, and 
the debate about the prioritisation of L, F and C, can be described as a debate in public 
reason. This debate is based, in part, on the ethical and empirical analysis of the 
effectiveness of F. This is likely to inform both the idea of C as a principle, and the 
content of L (including LL, LG and possibly UL). C may also have an effect on firms 
prior to any incorporation into L. In this case, we may argue that firms are subject to this 
element of global public reason.    
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Part 3: Employment and authority 
 
Introduction  
 
Parts 3, 4 and 5 address some specific issues in international business ethics. This will 
continue the consideration of how an ethical analysis of business activity might work.  
 
Employment and authority 
 
The idea of employment raises a series of important and complex issues for an ethical 
analysis of business.  
 
Employment can be seen as one means of bringing together, binding and coordinating the 
social activity of the firm. The principle of legality (L) establishes much of the formal 
basis for employment. The principle of financial return (F) establishes the basis for much 
of the informal content of employment, within the formal structure of L. A central 
dimension of the bounded nature of the social activity of the firm is set by the formal and 
informal nature of employment. Employment has great ethical significance for 
individuals seen as members of firms, other social activities and communities and as 
citizens of jurisdictions.  
 
In these notes I will discuss one aspect of employment: the idea that employment 
involves the exercise of authority. When individuals enter into employment within firms, 
and other organisations, they are typically subject to the authority of others. In many 
cases individuals also exercise authority over others. An analysis of the exercise authority 
may be central to understanding the nature and ethical significance of employment.  
 
Authority and reasons for acting 
 
We can start with a working definition of authority.  
 
In general, authority can be described as a quality attributed to an individual or institution 
that provides for an agreed capacity to make laws, policies, regulations, standards, rules 
and decisions that the individual or institution can expect others to accept. In this sense, 
an individual or institution with authority has the capacity to bind others.  
 
We can develop this definition in the following way: if you have authority, then you may 
give me reasons for thinking and acting in a manner that I otherwise would not have 
thought or acted. If I accept your authority in a given situation, I will think and act in 
accordance with the reasons that you provide. This may apply in all situations, including 
where I only partially understand your reasons, or disagree with them, or have reasons for 
acting in some other way.
28
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The idea of thinking and acting on the basis of another’s reasons cuts across the idea that 
individuals act on the basis of their own reasons. However, taking into account another’s 
reasons, and the arguments that underpin these reasons, is part of formulating our own 
reasons. We may accept the authority of others, understood in its widest sense, when we 
accept any reasons in this way.  
 
The exercise of authority may require a particular process for giving and accepting 
reasons that would allow for individuals both to accept the authority of others and to 
formulate their own reasons. As a result of this process I accept your reasons, and act on 
the basis of these reasons as an agent. I may then be responsible for the actions and 
outcomes that result from these reasons.  
 
This suggests a useful distinction between the exercise of authority and the use of power. 
Power involves the use of coercion or force as a process for accepting reasons. To 
develop this distinction: in some cases I may appeal to the idea of power as grounds for 
the argument that I am not responsible for an action that I am forced to carry out by you. 
I may have been physically forced to act, in which case I may argue that I did not form 
any reason for acting. In many cases I may argue that although I formed a reason to act, 
this was a response to coercion and so at the limit of the idea of a reason. In these cases I 
may argue that I was carrying out your reasons for acting. This may be one application of 
the idea that you are using me as a means rather than treating me as an end.  
 
The process of giving and accepting reasons may also involve an appeal to ideas of 
freedom. When I accept your authority, I may have in mind a particular process for giving 
and accepting reasons that retains my capacity to act as an autonomous agent. I may 
argue for retaining the possibility of accepting reasons other than yours, and for the 
possibility of disagreeing with your reasons even if I have otherwise accepted your 
authority. At the same time, when I accept your authority I may suspend some aspects of 
my freedom, in particular to act directly on the basis of my own reasons.  
 
The relationship between authority, power and freedom requires further analysis. 
 
The need for authority 
 
The discussion so far suggests that the exercise of authority is both ethically significant 
and ethically complex. In particular, it may overlap with, or collapse into, the exercise of 
power, and it may cut across the idea of freedom. We may ask whether the exercise of 
authority is ever justified or is ever required. 
 
We have already suggested that authority in its widest sense may form part of the process 
of formulating reasons for thinking and acting. On this view, if I accept any reason that 
you propose then I have, to this extent at least, accepted your authority. 
 
A wider argument for the exercise of authority is based on the need for some ordering of 
social activities. This is itself in part an ethical argument, based on the ethical 
significance of the actions and outcomes of these social activities, and in part an 
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empirical argument, based on the idea that authority is the most effective means of 
ordering these social activities. 
 
Social activities in general require collective action to achieve outcomes, and these 
actions may require some coordination. Authority may enable coordination through 
combining reasons for acting that support a collective outcome.  
 
Some of the actions and outcomes pursued by social activities may be in conflict or may 
be incompatible. This may require the exercise of authority to adjudicate between the 
reasons that result in these actions and outcomes. 
 
The actions and outcomes of social activities cut across a range of principles that are 
ethically significant such as freedom, discussed above, rights and justice. Authority may 
require and constrain reasons for acting both within and between social activities in order 
to maintain these principles.  
 
Even if we accept that social activities require some ordering, we may ask whether there 
are alternatives to authority.  
 
The ordering of reasons for acting may resolve itself spontaneously over time. On this 
view, the process of giving and accepting reasons leads to voluntary agreements between 
people that provide for sufficient ordering. One view of free markets appeals in part to 
this argument.  
 
A more active approach may suggest one of a range of decision making processes for 
ordering reasons without involving the exercise of authority. The procedures of 
democratic decision making and consensual decision making in general may seek to 
achieve this, or at least to substantially reduce the need for authority. These procedures 
combine the need for coordination with ordering principles that are themselves freely 
accepted by individuals.  
 
Both spontaneous agreement and decision making processes for agreement would need to 
produce unanimous decisions if the requirement for authority is to be removed 
completely. 
 
A further view may be to argue for the exercise of power rather than authority. This may 
be ruled out by the objections mentioned above, and so may not provide an alternative to 
authority. However, the exercise of power may well be a compelling and apparently 
effective way of achieving ordering. This may be particularly attractive to those who 
benefit from the outcomes of social activities including, in the short term at least, those 
who are subject to the exercise of power. One implication may be that power becomes a 
threat to the exercise of authority rather than an alternative it.  
 
If each of these and other alternatives to authority are found to be ineffective, incomplete 
or unattractive as a means of ordering social activities, this suggests that some exercise of 
authority may be required and justified.  
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The exercise of authority 
 
The problem of ordering social activities and the balance between authority and freedom, 
is perhaps what Isaiah Berlin has in mind when he says, ‘The dilemma is logically 
insoluble: we cannot sacrifice either freedom or the organisation needed for its defence, 
or a minimum standard of welfare.’29 
 
If we accept some ethical and empirical justification for authority, we can ask how 
authority should be exercised. This involves asking on what basis I should accept your 
authority to give me reasons for thinking and acting in a manner that I otherwise would 
not have thought or acted. 
 
I may first ask whether the reasons you give me are themselves reasonable. This will 
involve both the factual claims and the claims about ethical significance that these 
reasons appeal to.  
 
One test of reasonableness is to ask whether I would have arrived at the same reasons had 
I fully reflected on the same factual and ethical claims. This is problematic in at least two 
ways. For relatively straightforward reasons, the costs of investigating the claims may 
outweigh the significance of the reasons themselves. For complex reasons, the costs of 
investigating the claims may be prohibitively high, for example because of the technical 
mastery of the issues required.  
 
The idea of public reasoning may involve the idea that reasonableness in this context 
involves at least the requirements that you state your reasons as clearly as possible, that 
you are able to explain the factual and ethical claims that that these reasons appeal to, and 
that you open to at least some questioning and debate about the claims involved, however 
complex these claims might be. 
 
The limits to the degree to which I can fully investigate your reasons, even if I accept 
these as minimally reasonable, suggest that I may have to accept your reasons based on 
your claim to authority itself. I may then ask whether your claim to authority is 
legitimate.  
 
Legitimacy here may concern the process by which you have come to claim authority and 
how you maintain this claim as you exercise authority. Two examples of sources of 
legitimacy may be specialist knowledge and institutional position. The claim to specialist 
knowledge suggests that you are in a better position than others to understand the reasons 
for acting in a given situation. The positional claim will appeal to formal and informal 
procedures for achieving a position of authority within a social activity. These procedures 
may themselves appeal to ethically significant ideas such as fairness.  
 
The reasonableness and legitimacy of authority may be open ended. Factual, ethical and 
procedural claims may be more or less disputed and, in some cases, based on 
incompatible claims about ethical significance. I may then consider a further dimension 
                                                 
29 Isaiah Berlin, Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century, in Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford, 1969, pp. 39-40 
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to your claim to authority. I may accept your claim to authority because I trust your 
judgement on these issues. In particular, I may trust that you have understood and 
reflected on the factual, ethical and procedural issues at stake and that the reasons for 
acting you propose are reasonable and legitimate. Trusting your judgement may in turn 
appeal to ideas of integrity or, in general, ideas of virtue.  
 
This sketch of the basis for claims to authority suggests that I may accept your authority 
if I consider this claim to be reasonable and legitimate, and if I trust your judgement. 
Each of these arguments needs to be worked out in detail, and other dimensions may be 
involved. These arguments may suggest a minimum basis for me to accept your reasons 
for acting in a given situation.  
 
This sketch suggests limits to the idea that authority involves persuading me of your 
reasons for acting. This may include ideas of charisma, where I am persuaded by your 
rhetoric or by aspects of the attractiveness of your personality.  
 
This sketch may also help to clarify the boundary between authority and power. The 
exercise of power may remove all or most of the appeal to reasonableness, legitimacy and 
judgement. I may accept your reasons for acting, but on the basis of force or coercion 
rather than your authority.  
 
The exercise of authority and employment: some suggestions 
 
Claims to authority are made within social activities of all kinds, including within firms 
as bounded social activities. The discussion so far suggests that the need to order social 
activities, including firms, provides some justification for these claims, and that it is 
possible to establish a minimal basis for claiming authority in given situations.  
 
Employment within firms typically involves both making claims to authority and being 
subject to the authority of others. The process of giving and accepting reasons for acting 
can be seen in the day-to-day activities of firms. For much of this activity the various 
claims to authority may not be contested. Reasonableness, legitimacy and judgement may 
have been established as a background context for these activities. In these cases I may be 
inclined to accept your claim to authority and to accept your reasons for acting, at least in 
the short term.  
 
At the same time, people within firms may make day-to-day assessments such as, ‘he 
doesn’t know what he is talking about’, ‘it’s not fair’ or ‘I don’t trust him’. These 
assessment can be seen as comments on, and concerns about, the exercise of authority, 
even if these assessments turn out to be unreasonable in particular cases.  
 
Day-to-day assessments become more critical when we move from matters of lesser to 
greater ethical significance. For example, I may be asked to accept reasons that result in 
my own redundancy or reasons that would require me to act in a manner that I would 
otherwise reject. In these cases the claim to authority that sustains these reasons, in 
addition to the reasons themselves, may be contested.      
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Many firms are based on complex and extensive employment relationships. The day-to-
day and one-to-one exercise of authority may be the most immediate expression of these 
relationships. We can describe these relationships as part of a complex pattern of 
authority, typically in the form of a structured hierarchy. Positions of authority within this 
hierarchy may be described using overlapping descriptions such as manager (including 
junior, middle and senior managers), director, owner, board member and, more generally, 
leader.   
 
One dimension of the experience of employment may be described as the more or less 
continuous and practical working out of claims to authority at all of these levels across 
hierarchies. 
 
The analysis from Parts 1 and 2 suggests some of the overarching principles that firms 
may appeal to as the basis for reasons for acting: the two primary principles may be L and 
F. These principles form the overarching basis for claims to authority within firms. L 
provides the basis for multiple formal reasons for acting, including specific legal aspects 
of employment. F provides the basis for shaping the social activity of the firm, including 
the organisation of work and the hierarchical arrangements, and the basis of multiple 
informal reasons for acting. Principles L and F may not be appealed to on a day-to-day 
basis, but they may establish the boundary within which multiple formal and informal 
reasons are appealed to.  
 
From the analysis in Parts 1 and 2, we can discuss the further dimensions of L and F in a 
global context, for example the distinction between local legality (LL), multiple legality 
(ML) and universal legality (UL), as the principles that establish the boundary of the 
firm. In these notes we can use L and F.   
 
Arguments about the principles themselves and the claims to authority that appeal to 
these principles are related. For example, if the reasonableness of F is contested this may 
affect claims to authority within firms that are based in part on an appeal to F. 
 
If employment involves authority, we can ask to what extent dissent from authority is 
acceptable within employment. We have suggested that a claim to authority, for example 
in contrast to the exercise of power, involves giving and accepting reasons with 
explanation and questioning. On this basis some dissent is built into the idea of authority. 
However, the idea of authority also suggests a limit to dissent if I am to accept your claim 
to authority.  
 
If we start from L and F, there may be a range of reasons that may be open to the 
possibility of further dissent. Some formal reasons within L may be relatively clear, based 
on the rule of law, and may be considered reasonable and legitimate. However, informal 
reasons, particularly those within F, may be more open to questioning. Indeed, based on 
the analysis in Parts 1 and 2, there may be further principles within extended 
responsibility (ER) that do not fall within L and F. One example of ER is a principle of 
human rights (HR), particularly in a global context. We can discuss the implications of 
this and other principles. 
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One way to analyse this situation is to see the individual as both employed within the 
firm as a bounded social activity and as a member of other social activities, including as a 
citizen within a jurisdiction. The idea of citizenship itself includes ideas of authority, 
freedom and dissent. The outer limit of dissent may be set by the idea of citizenship, and 
this may be very wide in the case of democratic citizenship. Indeed it may appear to have 
no limit in areas such as freedom of thought and conscience.   
 
If I accept your claim to authority within the firm, I may also accept some limit to the 
idea of dissent. This appears to suggest a tighter limit to dissent than is set by citizenship. 
However, some aspects of citizenship, including those aspects included within L, may 
limit or constrain claims to authority within firms.  
 
For example, it may be reasonable and legitimate for a manager to set the responsibilities 
and activities that are expected of an employee. However, this must operate within 
specific aspects of L, such as employment law and health & safety law, and within wider 
aspects of L and the idea of citizenship, including ideas such as freedom of thought and 
conscience. The latter argument in particular may create limits to ideas of persuasion 
within firms, including some aspects of a firm’s training of employees. 
 
In some cases it may be argued that dissent can directly challenge the exercise of 
authority within firms. In particular, an idea of whistle blowing may suggest that an 
individual is permitted to expose an aspect of a firm’s actions or outcomes in a manner 
that breaks an otherwise reasonable and legitimate constraint on this reason for acting, 
such as confidentiality. These are problematic cases and need to be explored in more 
detail. One possible approach may be to consider ideas of civil disobedience that seek to 
provide some basis for citizens to challenge the authority of aspects of L within a 
jurisdiction. We can discuss the idea of public reasoning from the analysis in Parts 1 and 
2 as one route into these issues.  
 
This discussion has sketched out some ideas about how the idea of employment involves 
the exercise of authority. This has included ideas about authority itself and some initial 
suggestions for how these ideas may throw light on the nature of employment within 
firms.  
 
Part 4: Business disciplines and rationality 
 
Introduction  
 
Part 4 considers an ethical analysis of areas of business knowledge and activity such as 
finance, accounting, marketing and advertising. I will refer to these as business 
disciplines, as discussed below.  
 
I suggest that this involves discussing the relationship between the rationality of these 
disciplines and an ethical analysis of business. These notes will concentrate on some of 
the conceptual issues involved. The application of these ideas to practical examples from 
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each of the four disciplines, and from other areas of business knowledge and activity, can 
be discussed further. 
 
Business disciplines 
 
We can start by sketching out how the four areas of business knowledge and activity may 
develop into disciplines.  
 
One picture of this development is as follows. Ideas and practice within each area build 
over time into bodies of theory. The various elements of theory inform, more or less 
directly, a firm’s reasons for acting. The actions and outcomes that follow from these 
reasons form a body of practice that is held as tacit knowledge by practitioners. Some 
elements of this tacit knowledge may be articulated and, to some extent, analysed through 
the commentary and writing of practitioners. The actions and outcomes of practitioners 
may also be analysed through systematic empirical research. Tacit knowledge, 
practitioner commentary and empirical research may provide the basis for further 
systematic theoretical research. 
 
The combination of theory, tacit knowledge, practitioner commentary and empirical 
research forms a body of knowledge for each discipline. This body of knowledge is one 
way to describe the dimensions of each discipline. There are likely to be overlaps 
between each of the four disciplines identified and with other disciplines, but each body 
of knowledge is sufficiently distinct for the idea of a discipline to be useful.  
 
This various elements within the body of knowledge for each discipline may work out 
differently in each case. For example: ideas in finance and accounting theory and practice 
may be more formal than ideas in marketing and advertising; finance and accounting may 
make greater use of mathematics than other disciplines; the legal boundaries to finance 
and accounting may be more significant for practice in these disciplines than in other 
disciplines; accounting practice may be more informed by legal boundaries and less 
informed by complex mathematical models than finance; marketing and advertising 
practice are also bound by legality, but this may have less direct influence on theories 
within this boundary.   
 
An ethical analysis of these disciplines will form part of the wider ethical analysis of 
business. Drawing on ideas discussed in Parts 1 and 2, the principles of legality (L) and 
financial return (F) will provide the overall basis for reasons for acting in each discipline. 
In general, L will define the relatively formal constraints and requirements in each 
discipline and F will define the relatively informal opportunities that each discipline 
considers. 
 
A more detailed ethical analysis of each discipline will encounter a substantial body of 
knowledge comprising theory, tacit knowledge, practitioner commentary and empirical 
research. Understanding these bodies of knowledge will require substantial expertise.  
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From a methodological point of view, this suggests the need for collaboration between 
individuals engaged in an ethical analysis and individuals with the relevant expertise in 
each discipline.  
 
This methodological issue reflects an analysis of how each discipline may inform a firm’s 
reasons for acting.  
 
Rationality 
 
Practitioners, commentators and researchers in each discipline may interpret the relevant 
body of knowledge as primarily concerned with rationality. On this view, the body of 
knowledge in each discipline provides a complex account of rationality. These accounts 
inform a firm’s rational reasons for acting. 
 
It may be useful here to refer to the working definitions of rationality and of ethical 
significance suggested in Part 1: The Responsibilities of Firms. These working 
definitions, in common with most definitions in ethics, are only partially adequate and 
potentially controversial.  
 
Rationality may be described as the capacity of an agent to determine which actions are 
required to achieve given outcomes. In some cases this includes the capacity to determine 
the most efficient and effective actions. Rationality may also refer to the nature of 
outcomes, but may suggest that these are not ethical outcomes but based, for example, on 
the rational interests of the agent.  
 
Ethical significance may be described as the harm or benefit caused by actions and 
outcomes including interests. The ideas of harm and benefit are informed by moral 
intuitions, moral values or moral principles.  
 
When used in this discussion, these definitions do not suggest that the four disciplines 
make no reference to ethical significance. In fact, these disciplines may make more or 
less explicit reference to ethical significance of various kinds. For example: practitioners 
may discuss ethical issues in accounts of day-to-day business practice, including ethical 
issues encountered as a result of pursuing particular outcomes; commentators may 
discuss the ethical implications of specific practices; all disciplines may form part of the 
development of professional ethics and codes of conduct in the respective areas; 
researchers may engage directly in an ethical analysis of various practical and theoretical 
issues. However, it does appear that each of the disciplines is primarily concerned with 
detailed accounts of rationality.  
 
Reasons for acting 
 
The discussion so far suggests the following picture of a firm’s reasons for acting. The 
firm appeals to a complex range of reasons for acting. Some of these reasons will appeal 
to ideas drawn from the four disciplines. The disciplines will provide the rational basis 
for many of the actions and outcomes of the firm. This will include identifying the 
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possible outcomes of the firm, including intermediate outcomes such as a successful 
product launch, and overarching outcomes such as increasing shareholder value. This will 
also include identifying the actions required to achieve these outcomes. In some cases, 
the disciplines will suggest choices between actions and, to some extent, choices between 
outcomes.   
 
We can describe this identification of actions and outcomes as part of the rationality of 
the firm, and of the individual agents who make up the firm. This view of the firm’s 
rationality is likely to be highly developed and highly complex, particularly in disciplines 
such as finance and accounting.  
 
We have suggested that the reasons drawn from the four disciplines may include some 
references to ethical significance, and that this may form part of the rationality of the 
firm. This does not suggest that these references can simply be translated into aspects of 
rationality; however it does suggest that the ethical analysis that has resulted in these 
references may have taken place outside of the four disciplines. 
 
On this view, references to ethical significance form part of the theoretical and practical 
analysis within the four disciplines as ethical facts and, in this sense, form part of the 
rationality of the firm. So, given a particular ethical fact, the discipline may suggest how 
the might the firm could respond to this fact through its actions and outcomes. 
 
This discussion does not assume that the subject areas of the four disciplines, the 
distinction between these and other disciplines, and the distinction between the 
disciplines and an ethical analysis, are theoretically or practically fixed. This suggests 
that a direct analysis of ethical significance within each of the four disciplines is not ruled 
out.   
 
If we assume that the four disciplines have relatively distinct subject areas we can 
consider the relationship between the disciplines and an ethical analysis. 
 
We can describe the firm as a bounded social activity. The four disciplines provide the 
basis for rational reasons for acting within the boundary of the firm. The boundary of the 
firm is set in part by L and F. We can describe the disciplines as setting out the rationality 
of the firm operating on the basis of L and F.  
 
Much of the content of the four disciplines will provide the detailed basis for rational 
reasons for acting. We can begin to describe the relationship between the disciplines and 
an ethical analysis using L and F. We can discuss each in turn. 
 
L sets part of the boundary of the firm, and provides legal facts for the firm, at least in the 
short term. The four disciplines will assume much of L. L is based on the non-legal 
principle of the rule of law. The content of, and changes to, L may appeal directly to 
ethical significance. On this view, the content of the law is based on an ethical analysis, 
and law comprises legal facts once enacted.  
 
Notes on Business Ethics 
Laurence Cranmer 2010  Notes on Business Ethics - 2010-11.doc 33 
We have previously suggested that F is based on the ethical and empirical arguments for 
making a financial return. The four disciplines may assume F as the basis for business 
activity, at least in the short term, and may also make a significant contribution to the 
detailed arguments for F. For example, the ideas and models within corporate finance 
may be used to show that particular actions within firms and financial markets will 
maximise the value of the firm as a bounded social activity. This may be further 
developed when corporate finance is combined with the related discipline of economics. 
These arguments may in turn contribute to changes to L. 
 
Rational and ethical reasons 
 
We have made a distinction between rationality and ethical significance.  
 
The rationality of the firm describes the firm’s reasons for acting within the boundary of 
the firm. The four disciplines inform these reasons for acting. This can be described as 
looking at reasons from within the firm. This may correspond to the idea of internal 
reasons. These are reasons as they appear to agents within the firm. 
 
Rational reasons assume that agents have roles within the firm and act to achieve the 
outcomes of the firm by appealing to L and F. An ethical analysis may describe the firm 
as a bounded social activity, and includes an ethical analysis of L and F as principles that 
in part set the boundary of the firm. 
 
The analysis of the responsibilities of firms may provide an example of these ideas. We 
can start with a distinction between two descriptions of the attempt to analyse the 
responsibilities of firms: ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR) as this may be seen 
within the firm as a business issue; and, ‘corporate responsibility’ (CR) as this may be 
seen outside of the firm as an ethical analysis of the firm’s activities.  
 
CSR describes, in part, a business activity within the boundary of the firm. Elements of 
CSR may inform the firm’s reasons for acting. These reasons appeal to arguments based 
on, for example, customer and investor preferences. The firm’s reasons for acting based 
on an appeal to these arguments are part of the rationality of the firm. 
 
In some cases these rational reasons for acting may use ethical language. This language 
suggests interesting dimensions of, and changes to, for example, the preferences of 
customers and investors. These may be described as ethical facts for the firm and may 
inform the firm’s reasons for acting within F. The four disciplines may provide 
significant rational approaches to support these reasons for acting. 
 
CR on the other hand describes part of an ethical analysis. This is an analysis of the 
actions and outcomes that the firm may be responsible for within and beyond the 
boundary of the firm. This analysis may also inform the firm’s reasons for acting as 
ethical reasons.   
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The use of ethical language in both cases suggests that these analyses intersect. This may 
create some confusion about the meaning of the language used. 
 
We can see principles L and F as the boundary at which rational and ethical reasons 
intersect. Inside the boundary of the firm, set by L and F, the four disciplines and other 
disciplines inform rational reasons for acting. In this sense, L and F are rational reasons 
as they confront the firm. Outside of the boundary of the firm we can see that rational 
reasons intersect with and may give way to ethical reasons. The four disciplines may not 
inform these reasons for acting. 
 
It is important to note that the ideas of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the boundary of the firm are 
in part a result of the diagrammatic representation of the boundaries of the firm. This 
may not be the best way to describe the firm’s reasons for acting. Another way to 
describe this may be the idea of a space of reasons through which agents navigate and 
exercise agency. This idea requires further analysis. 
 
We now have a picture of firms forming reasons for acting that are informed by the four 
disciplines as the basis for actions within the firm. These reasons will appeal to L and F 
overall. We can describe these as rational reasons. At the same time the firm may form 
reasons based on an appeal to ethical significance. This may include appeals to the ethical 
significance of L and F, and appeals to ethical significance within the boundary of the 
firm informed by the four disciplines. 
 
The intersection of rational and ethical reasons 
 
We have suggested that ethical language can describe ethical facts as they confront the 
agent. These ethical facts may inform rational reasons for acting. At the same time, we 
may discern ethical significance in reasons for acting that are not described using ethical 
language. The reasons may be rational reasons, but may also appeal to ethical 
significance.  
 
These observations suggest that the idea of a space of reasons may be a complex and 
intersecting mix of rational and ethical reasons. To discuss this further we can return to 
the example of the analysis of CSR and CR.  
 
We have suggested that CSR may form part of the firm’s rational reasons for acting. CSR 
may also suggest reasons that are not part of a firm’s rationality. The appeal to ethical 
significance as part of CR may also inform reasons for acting for the firm. This could 
result from a firm taking on a responsibility outside of the boundary of the firm. It could 
also result from a responsibility becoming part of F, for example though changes in 
customer or investor preferences. In these cases it appears that an ethical reason has 
become a rational reason for the firm. 
 
This discussion suggests a distinction between rational and ethical reasons for acting.  
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On one view of this distinction there are two types of reasons for acting: rational and 
ethical. This makes sense of one aspect of our use of reasons: in many cases we seem to 
appeal either to ethical significance or to rational considerations. This view may reflect a 
distinction that is often made between fact and value.   
 
Another view suggests that reasons for acting are a complex mix of appeals to ethical 
significance and rationality, with limiting cases at each end of a spectrum of reasons. At 
one end of the spectrum these reasons make a direct appeal to ethical significance with a 
minimal appeal to rationality. At the other end of the spectrum these reasons make a 
direct appeal to rationality with ethical significance embedded in this idea of rationality.  
 
Further analysis will be required to consider whether these views suggest one or two 
types of reasons. 
 
Both views provide possible accounts of the point at which ethical and rational reasons 
intersect. The former suggests a boundary between one type of reason and another. The 
latter suggests movement along a spectrum of reasons. We have suggested that for firms 
the appeal to L and F may mark the point at which ethical and rational reasons intersect. 
L and F form the boundary of the rationality of the firm, and at the same time L and F as 
principles involve appeals to ethical significance.  
 
Another way of looking at this may be as follows: the firm’s rational reasons for acting 
can be sustained as long as appeals to ethical significance are relatively settled. The four 
disciplines provide part of the basis for these rational reasons within the boundary of the 
firm.  
 
However, the appeal to rational reasons may become unsatisfactory if the ethical 
significance of the actions and outcome that result from these reasons is questioned. 
Actions that have previously been considered rational may now raise questions about 
whether these actions are right or wrong. Outcomes that resulted from these actions may 
now raise questions about whether they are good or bad outcomes.  
 
The instability of reasons for acting may result from the changing, incompatible and open 
ended nature of at least some aspects of ethical significance, even where other aspects of 
ethical significance have been agreed. It may also result from the difficulty of taking into 
account all the intended and unintended outcomes of actions over time. This instability 
may not be fully incorporated into the firm’s rationality, including as this is informed by 
the four disciplines.   
 
The stability of reasons for acting may result from the working out over time of some 
aspects of ethical significance and working out the rational actions required to meet 
ethically agreed outcomes. For the firm, this will include L and F, and the substantial 
contribution of the four disciplines to the rationality of the firm within the boundary set 
by L and F. 
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The issue of corporate responsibility may provide a useful example of these ideas. The 
firm’s understanding of its responsibilities may by relatively stable over time. However, 
changes in views about the ethical significance of some of the firm’s actions and 
outcomes may raise questions about these responsibilities. In some cases these questions 
may be raised within the four disciplines, for example: marketing may discover changes 
in customer preferences; or, accounting practices may be used to audit outcomes that are 
currently outside of the boundary of the firm as set by L and F. 
 
These questions are raised as part of CR, as discussed above. Firms may respond to these 
questions through an analysis of the scope and limits of responsibility. CSR may be seen 
as one response to this analysis. CSR becomes part of the firm’s rational reasons for 
acting. The four disciplines may provide some of the content for these rational reasons. 
 
These rational reasons may not fully reflect all the concerns about the ethical significance 
of the firm’s actions and outcomes, or may not fully capture changes in views about 
ethical significance. These concerns may suggest further analysis of the responsibilities 
of the firm as part of CR.  
 
Part 5: Firms and the environment 
 
Introduction  
 
Part 5 considers how an ethical analysis of business activity and the environment might 
work. These notes concentrate on some of the conceptual issues involved.  
 
Responsibilities and the environment 
 
One way to start an analysis of business activity and the environment is to draw on and 
apply some of the ideas developed in previous Parts 1 and 2. 
 
We have suggested that the firm is a bounded social activity. The boundary of the firm is 
set in part by appeal to the principles of legality (L) and financial return (F). L and F are 
overarching principles that form the basis for the firm’s reasons for acting. We have also 
noted the global dimensions of these principles, but we can use L and F for the discussion 
in Part 5. We have suggested that L and F may describe the extent of the firm’s 
responsibilities for its actions and outcomes.  
 
On this view, questions about the environmental effect of a firm’s action and outcomes 
may be described as questions about the content of L and F. The public debate about the 
environment may lead to changes in regulation and legislation and result in changes to L. 
The public debate may also change customer and investor preferences on questions about 
the environment, for example: customers may select products on the basis of their overall 
environment impact in addition to price; investors may make similar decisions, and may 
also respond to changes in customer preferences. These are changes to F. Changes to L 
and F will change the position of the boundary of the firm.  
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If the effect of these changes is to extend the responsibilities of firms for the outcomes of 
their actions, this will move the boundary of the firm outwards. Outcomes that have not 
previously been considered the firm’s responsibility may now be considered part of the 
firm’s responsibilities. Some changes may of course contract the responsibilities of firms, 
and so move the boundary of the firm inwards. 
 
These changes may concern both the actions and the outcomes of the firm. Many 
environmental questions for firms will concern outcomes, for example pollution and 
carbon emissions. However, some questions will be more concerned with actions. For 
example, in the case of animal testing one view may be that some or all testing is wrong 
in principle independent of the outcomes of this testing for human welfare.  
 
This suggests that environmental questions may be fully described using the idea of the 
firm as a social activity with boundaries set in part by L and F. On this view the public 
debate about the environment takes place outside of the firm and affects the firm through 
changes in L and F. The firm may be active in seeking to understand, respond to and in 
some cases anticipate changes to L and F. However, the principles that set the boundaries 
of the firm remain the same, even as the content of these principles changes.  
 
This is consistent with the distinction between internal and external reasons for acting. 
The internal reasons of the firm continue to appeal to L and F. This is also consistent with 
the idea that the firm may operate within an idea of public reasoning, but is not subject to 
public reasoning in the sense that it is bound by reasons for acting beyond L and F. 
 
In Parts 1 and 2 we have suggested that the boundary of the firm may be set by other 
principles in addition to L and F. These may be described in general as extended 
responsibilities (ER). A more detailed analysis of ER suggests a range of more specific 
responsibilities, some of which may be concerned with aspects of the environment. 
Environmental principles may be described in general as environmental responsibilities 
(EN) or as particular responsibilities for aspects of the environment such as carbon 
emissions (CE), habitat maintenance (HM), biodiversity (BD), deforestation (DF), 
animal testing (AT). Each of these responsibilities may involve a range of specific 
requirements for firms. 
 
For this discussion we can describe these responsibilities as EN in general. If EN 
becomes a principle that informs a firm’s reasons for acting, we will need to work 
through the prioritisation of L, F and EN. One outcome may be for EN to become a 
subordinate principle that is appealed to after L and F have been satisfied. Another 
outcome may suggest that EN is appealed to prior to F, or prior to a version of F such as 
F (maximise). This is similar to the discussion of Capabilities as a principle in Part 2: 
Global Responsibilities of Firms.  
 
The argument that EN becomes a dominant principle with regard to L, F, or versions of F, 
will need to work through the implications of this argument for L and F. We can briefly L 
and F in turn.  
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L appeals to the non-legal principle of the rule of law. The content of L may be 
determined through the process of reasonable and legitimate democratic public debate, 
public policy formation and legislation. On this view, firms should be able to able to act 
freely within L. In addition, firms may have limited information and limited legitimacy to 
act beyond L.  
 
F appeals to the wider ethical and empirical arguments for the effectiveness of making a 
financial return. F provides much of the basis for the organisation of the firm, interactions 
across supply chains, and the relationship with other firms and social activities, all within 
L. The argument for EN to become a dominant principle with regard to F would need to 
show a greater balance of good outcomes overall given the ethical and empirical 
arguments for F. 
 
Rationality and the environment 
 
In Part 4: Business Disciplines and Rationality we suggested that the firm’s reasons for 
acting may be described as forming part of the rationality of the firm. The stability or 
instability of these reasons for acting may depend on the extent to which questions of 
ethical significance are settled or disputed.  
 
The public debate about EN provides a good example of the potential instability of 
reasons for acting. Ideas about the ethical significance of aspects of the environment and 
the empirical basis for understanding the environment may change over time. This may 
create instability in previously accepted rational reasons for acting, as well as informing 
further refection on ethical significance. 
 
One example of these changes over time is the issue of carbon emissions (CE), as one 
principle within EN. There is an extensive and sustained public debate on this issue 
involving both empirical and ethical issues. The former concerns the effect of carbon 
emissions on the climate, and the practical and technological response to these affects. 
The latter concerns the impact of carbon emissions on human welfare and other aspects 
of the environment, and on the responsibilities that follow from these impacts. We will 
discuss the example of CE in more detail below.  
 
At this stage, we can argue that the empirical and ethical issues generated by CE may 
affect the firm’s reasons for acting. These changes, and in particular changes in ethical 
significance, may not be incorporated into the firm’s rationality, at least in the short term.  
 
However, CE may change the content of L. This will change the boundary of the firm and 
will change the firm’s reasons for acting within L. CE may also change customer and 
investor preferences, ranging from creating a market of low carbon products to the 
reputational dimensions of a firm’s response to CE as a global issue. These changes will 
change F and so change the boundary of the firm. Ideas such as carbon trading may result 
from changes to L that change the opportunities for firms operating within F.  
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Changes to L and F may also be anticipated by firms. In these cases, the firm may appeal 
to the long term impact on L and F prior to these changes occurring. This will also 
change the boundary of the firm. 
 
One way that firms may respond to current and future changes to L and F resulting from 
CE is through acting on the basis of policies on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
This may also be called Sustainability, particularly when it involves a response to CE. 
Where CSR is a seen by the firm as a business issue it may be described as an aspect of F. 
Some aspects of CSR, as the firm’s response changes to F, may result from changes in, 
for example, customer and investor preferences. On this view, changes in ethical 
significance that inform CSR are then changes in ethical facts for the firm.  
 
These responses to current and future changes in L and F, may describe how these 
changes are incorporated into the rationality of the firm. This may involve changes to the 
position of the boundary of the firm, but may not change the idea of the firm as a social 
activity with boundaries set primarily by L and F.  
 
We have suggested that CE may become a principle that firms appeal to in addition to L 
and F. Some CSR policies may appeal directly to this idea. As we have discussed, CE 
may be a subordinate principle that is appealed to after the appeal to L and F has been 
satisfied. In some cases CE may in fact become part of the appeal to F. Where CE 
becomes a subordinate principle to L and F, but has relative priority over other 
subordinate principles, this may suggest important changes within the firm. However, 
these changes do not affect the overall priority of L and F as the principles that set the 
boundary of the firm.  
 
Another possibility is that CE becomes a dominant principle and can be analysed in a 
similar manner to the idea of Capabilities as a principle discussed in Notes on Business 
Ethics Part 2. CE may not become a dominant principle over L, based on the ethical 
significance of the rule of law. However, it may become dominant principle over some 
aspects of F. This may result in a prioritisation such as: L, F(survival), CE, F(maximise). 
On this basis, the firm will act to make a financial return to survive but will not act to 
maximise a financial return until after some version of CE has been satisfied. 
 
This prioritisation may also become part of the rationality of the firm. The firm now acts 
on the basis of rational reasons given the acceptance of some combination of principles 
L, F and CE.  
 
The incorporation of CE into a firm’s reasons for acting is an example of how views 
about ethical significance from outside of the firm may inform reasons for acting within 
the firm. This incorporation may result either through changes to L and F or through a 
further principle in addition to L and F. 
 
We have suggested that L and F can be seen as the point of intersection between rational 
and ethical reasons. In the case of CE, arguments about the ethical significance of the 
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environment are part of the public debate outside of the boundary of the firm. This debate 
may affect the firm through CE as a principle.  
 
CE may be seen as the basis for ethical reasons for acting from a point of view outside of 
the boundary of the firm, and as the basis for rational reasons for acting from a point of 
view within the firm. In both cases ethical language may be used. In the former this refers 
to views about ethical significance, in the latter this refers to ethical facts. This may 
create some confusion, but also suggests a point of intersection between rational and 
ethical reasons.  
 
It is interesting to note here that the same individual may use ethical language in both 
senses, and may also appeal to both ethical and rational reasons for acting. We can 
develop this idea using the example of the Chief Executive of a global oil company. This 
individual may make public statements that move between the views of a citizen and the 
views of a Chief Executive. Given the role of a Chief Executive these views may suggest 
the intersection between ethical reasons for acting for the citizen and rational reasons for 
acting for the firm.  
 
This individual may come to a view about CE as a citizen, and these views may inform 
personal reasons for acting for example through decisions about flying or car purchase. 
These views may also begin to affect the individual’s intentions in their role within the 
firm. These intentions alone may not form the basis for reasonable and legitimate reasons 
for acting as a Chief Executive. The intentions may however prompt the individual to 
consider whether these arguments may be relevant to the firm. The particular nature of 
the arguments about CE may already suggest implications for the actions and outcomes 
of the firm: CE concerns global environmental impacts of the kind that a global oil 
company may already have an interest in. This may not apply in the same manner to other 
principles within EN, or more widely within ER.  
 
Where CE does have implications for the firm this may inform the firm’s reasons for 
acting through L, F and possibly CE as discussed above. These may be described as 
rational reasons for acting for the firm.  
 
The personal reasons and the intentions of the Chief Executive do not, of course, provide 
a full analysis of any changes to the firm’s reasons for acting. However, this sketch may 
suggest one aspect of the intersection of between ethical and rational reasons for acting.  
 
Carbon Emissions: an example of an environmental issue 
 
The discussion so far has suggested some of the dimensions of environmental 
responsibilities (EN), within the wider group of extended responsibilities (ER). The 
discussion of responsibilities and rationality has used carbon emissions (CE) as an 
example.  
 
This section will extend the discussion of CE as an example of an environmental issue. It 
appears that CE shares some characteristics with other environmental issues, while at the 
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same time involving a series of arguments that make CE an issue of wide public debate 
and, on some views, an issue of particular importance.  
 
The discussion so far has considered some ways in which CE (and other aspects of EN) 
may affect a firm’s reasons for acting. This section will sketch out some implications of 
CE as an issue beyond the range of views about how CE may affect firms in particular. 
It is important to note here that this discussion makes no comment on the status of the 
scientific evidence for or against the effect of carbon emissions. The discussion seeks to 
consider the ethical implications of CE if some initial arguments are assumed.  
 
A first step is to identify and state clearly the arguments involved in CE. These arguments 
may be as follows. 
 
(1) The Earth’s climate is warming. This is primarily the result of human activity which 
has produced greenhouse gases, of which carbon emissions (CE) form a part. Further 
climate change is inevitable unless action is taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
including CE. 
 
(2) Most socio-economic sectors, ecological systems and human welfare will be 
adversely affected by climate change, with developing countries being most vulnerable to 
these effects. 
 
(3) Technologies and policies are available to reduce CE and other greenhouse gas 
emissions, but action must be taken to realise the potential of these technologies and 
policies. 
 
Argument (1) is based on scientific evidence. Understanding this evidence requires 
considerable technical expertise. This may not be readily available to citizens, 
policymakers or firms. Acceptance of (1) may then be based on the authority of scientists 
with this expert knowledge. One way to analyse claims to authority was suggested in Part 
3: Employment and Authority. On this view, the claim to authority of an institution such 
as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is based on the 
reasonableness, legitimacy and trust in the judgement of the scientists involved.  
 
Scientific authority in general is likely to require a commitment to accuracy, balance and 
clarity in the presentation of evidence. Scientific research is likely to require a 
commitment to objectivity and independence from prior ethical positions, including 
obligations to particular organisations that may compromise this objectivity.  
 
Where there appears to be any disagreement about (1) amongst individual scientists with 
a claim to authority, the authority of an institution such as the IPCC becomes particularly 
important. Citizens, policymakers and firms may not be in a position either to fully 
understand the evidence involved or to adjudicate between scientists who themselves 
disagree about the evidence.  
 
Notes on Business Ethics 
Laurence Cranmer 2010  Notes on Business Ethics - 2010-11.doc 42 
This suggests that acceptance of (1) involves both questions about the evidence itself and 
a series of ethical questions about how we may come to accept this evidence, including 
questions about claims to authority.  
 
Acceptance of (1) may have implications for our calculation of the outcomes of our 
actions. (1) draws attention to outcomes that we may not have previously considered, or 
considered to be unimportant. If we also accept (2) this may have implications for our 
reasons for acting. In particular, (2) suggests that the outcomes of our actions include bad 
outcomes that we had previously not taken into account.  
 
In general, an ethical analysis of the outcomes of our actions involves both empirical 
questions and questions about ethical significance. (1) suggests a change to the empirical 
calculation of the outcomes of our actions, and (2) suggest an unexpected ethical 
significance to these outcomes.   
 
If we accept (3) this suggests that there is the possibility of acting to reduce the effect of 
(1) and therefore to avoid some or all of the bad outcomes identified in (2).  
 
Acceptance of (1), (2) and (3) may provide the basis for reasons for acting. (1) provides 
an empirical basis for calculating the outcome of our actions; (2) suggests the ethical 
significance of these outcomes; and, (3) suggest the basis for avoiding or mitigating these 
outcomes. This raises a series of further issues.  
 
I may accept (1) and (2) but argue that my individual contribution to (1) is so small that 
the ethical significance of the contribution suggested by (2) reduces to almost nothing. If 
I only consider my individual contributions to (1) and (2), I may not change my reasons 
for acting. However, the basis for these reasons for acting may change. I have now made 
a new calculation of good and bad outcomes. (1) and (2) may form part of this 
calculation, but this has not changed the overall calculation or changed it very slightly.    
 
This may be an example of a wider issue for the calculation of good and bad outcomes. In 
many cases it will be very difficult to calculate and take into account all of the outcomes 
of my actions. This becomes more difficult if I include even small outcomes where these 
outcomes have at least some ethical significance. 
 
This may also be an example of the process of overall calculation of outcomes. In most 
cases this will involve both good and bad outcomes. In some cases there may be an 
overwhelmingly good or bad outcome that determines the result of this calculation. In 
other cases the balance of outcomes may be more problematic, particularly where the 
contribution of some outcomes is relatively small.    
 
A further issue involves the calculation of intended and unintended outcomes. I may 
argue that prior to accepting (1) I could exclude the ethical significance of (2) through 
lack of knowledge of (1). Once I accept (1) I can no longer make this argument. 
However, I may argue that I do not intend my actions to result in (2) when I act. 
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Although I accept the ethical significance of (2), I may argue that I do not need to take 
this into account because I did not intend these outcomes.  
 
It may be argued that although the idea of intention is ethically significant, it may not 
make me ethically exempt from the unintended outcomes described in (1). Acceptance of 
(1) suggests that that I may be able to predict and possibly to calculate the unintended 
outcomes of my actions. On this basis I should take (2) into account. On this view, I may 
need to consider both intended and unintended outcomes that I can reasonably predict and 
calculate.  
 
My reasons for acting are based on a balance of good and bad outcomes. I may argue that 
although I need to take (2) into account based on (1) as discussed, my contribution to (1) 
remains very small. This raises the issue of collective outcomes. I may need to consider 
the aggregated effect of my actions taken together with others, and the cumulative effect 
of these outcomes over time. If the aggregated and cumulative effect of these outcomes is 
very large, this may begin to weigh more heavily in my calculation of outcomes. The 
statement in (2) suggests an inequality in the effect of (1) on developing countries. 
Taking into account aggregated and, in particular, cumulative effects may extend this 
inequality to future generations.  
 
These arguments may directly affect my reasons for acting, even if my contribution to (1) 
is very small. I may now include (1) in the calculation of the outcomes of my actions. 
These arguments may affect my reasons for supporting collective responses to (2) and to 
(3). In many cases (3) will require a collective response either because of the requirement 
for decision making processes, including democratic processes, to formulate policies and 
because many actions will require social activities to develop appropriate technologies  
 
I may also consider two further aspects of the effect of my actions: on my own character 
and disposition; and, on others who know about my actions. Both of these dimensions 
may be considered further outcomes of my actions, in addition to those outcomes 
identified in (1). In the former case, I may argue that in addition to the potentially small 
contribution to (1), I express an ethically significant disposition towards (2) through my 
reasons for acting. In the latter case, I may argue that I extend the effect of my small 
contribution to (1) if I consider the effect of my actions on the reasons of others.  
 
The arguments sketched out may apply to the reasons for acting of any agent, although 
the examples so far have suggested an individual person as the agent. We can briefly 
discuss the application of these ideas to a range of agents including firms.  
 
One consideration for firms is the scale of the firm as a bounded social activity. For very 
small firms the scale of the contribution and response to (1), (2) and (3) may be similar to 
that of an individual. However, for many firms, including large multinational 
corporations, the scale will be significantly greater. The firm’s contribution to (1) may be 
large compared to other single agents, even if the contribution of any agent may be small 
compared to the overall effect of (1). This may suggest that the ethical significance of (2) 
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may then be greater in the balancing of good and bad outcomes. The firm may also have 
a greater expertise and capacity to contribute to (3) than any individual person.  
 
These arguments about carbon emission, and in particular the application to firms, may 
contribute to the analysis of CE as one principle within EN, and of EN as one principle 
within ER, in the context of L and F.  
 
The environment and ethical significance 
   
The discussion of CE assumes that aspects of the natural environment have an ethical 
significance. In the case of CE this is primarily based on the direct effect of the 
environment on human welfare. This is reflected in (2) above. 
 
This is one example of a wider analysis of the ethical significance of the environment. 
This involves complex relationships between the environment and human welfare. In 
some cases it may be argued that the idea that the environment has an ethical significance 
that is wholly or partially independent of human welfare.  
 
In this discussion we are considering the natural environment. This raises a series of 
questions about the idea of the natural. These questions involve complex conceptual, 
scientific and ethical issues. One way to describe an ethical analysis of these questions is 
as a spectrum of views about the ethical significance of human persons relative to aspects 
of the natural environment.  
 
At one end of this spectrum, human persons and human activity are clearly more ethically 
significant than the natural environment. This may support the view that humans may use 
the resources of the environment to meet their ethically significant ends, and that the 
resources themselves are not ethically significance, or have very little ethical 
significance. However, humans may have a duty to use these resources responsibly in 
order to promote and sustain human welfare. 
 
As one example, this view may support the idea that the ethical significance of animals 
concerns ideas about the welfare of animals as living beings that are ethically distinct 
from humans. The welfare of animals may permit the killing of animals for food, but may 
proscribe cruelty towards animals for pleasure and promote certain standards for keeping 
domestic and farm animals.  
 
Moving along the spectrum may support ideas about the intrinsic ethical significance of 
aspects of the environment including particular living beings, ecosystems and species or 
the biosphere as a whole. On some views, the ethical significance of these aspects of the 
environment may be subordinate to the ethical significance of humans, but is not derived 
from the ethical significance of human welfare. On other views, aspects of the 
environment may be close to or equal to the ethical significance of humans.  
 
In the case of animals this may support some ideas about vegetarianism and veganism 
that proscribe the farming and killing of animals for food. Some views may include a 
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version of rights for animals in general or for certain species such as the Great Apes. 
These views may also appeal to empirical claims such as the cognitive abilities of these 
species and the biological continuity between humans and animals. 
 
Views about the intrinsic ethical significance of ecosystems or the biosphere as a whole 
may be more complex. For example, these views may suggest that these systems are 
directly included in the calculation of good and bad outcomes based on the ethical 
significance of the biodiversity and complexity of the system itself.  
 
In other cases, the view of ethical significance may include human welfare. For example 
arguments about pollution or habitat maintenance may be based on the preservation of the 
biosphere as a system able to support human life. These views may appeal to the 
connections between humans and the environmental systems they inhabit.  
 
This discussion has very briefly suggested some ideas about the wider analysis of the 
ethical significance of the environment. These arguments may already appear to be at 
some distance from the concerns of firms. However, these arguments may form part of 
public debate and inform public policy and legislation on these matters. This may change 
L. In some cases, as with CE, these arguments may also contribute to the analysis EN as 
one principle within ER, in the context of L and F.  
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Non-Financial Value
A - Boundary 
of the firm?
B - Boundary of the 
supply chain?
C - Boundary of the 
immediate 
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environment?
D - Widest boundary of the global 
community and environment?
Figure 1: Boundaries and four dimensions of value
 
Notes on Business Ethics 
Laurence Cranmer 2010  Notes on Business Ethics - 2010-11.doc 47 
 
 
Narrow 
Financial 
Value
Wide Financial Value
External Financial Value
Non-Financial Value
A - Boundary 
of the firm?
B - Boundary of the 
supply chain?
C - Boundary of the 
immediate 
community and 
environment?
D - Widest boundary of the global 
community and environment?
Maximal view of 
corporate 
responsibility
Minimal view 
of corporate 
responsibility
Figure 2: Boundaries and a minimal-maximal spectrum of 
corporate responsibility
